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used	 for	 over	 two	 decades.	 However,	 their	 empirical	 validation	 is	 surprisingly	
scarce.	 We	 attempt	 to	 address	 this	 gap	 by	 empirically	 testing	 two	 of	 the	 more	
popular	 proxies,	 namely,	 Glosten	 and	 Harris	 (1988)	 adverse	 selection	 cost	
component	 of	 the	 bid‐ask	 spread	 (lambda),	 and	 Easley,	 Hvidkjaer,	 and	 O’Hara	
(2002)	 probability	 of	 informed	 trading	 (PIN).	 We	 estimate	 these	 proxies	 across	
three	 portfolios:	 broad‐based	 ETFs,	 sector	 ETFs,	 and	 common	 stocks.	 Arguably,	
information	 asymmetry	 about	 broad‐based	 ETFs	 should	 be	 primarily	 related	 to	
market	 wide	 information	 asymmetry,	 while	 information	 asymmetry	 about	 stocks	
should	be	mostly	related	to	firm	characteristics.	We	find	that	while	PIN	is	highest	for	
the	broad‐based	portfolio	and	 lowest	 for	 the	stock	portfolio,	 lambda	 is	highest	 for	













































The	 issue	 of	 asymmetric	 information	 in	 the	 financial	markets	 has	 received	
considerable	attention	in	both	accounting	and	finance	literature.	Since,	by	definition,	
information	 asymmetry	 is	 not	 directly	 observable,	 empirical	 research	 has	 relied	
almost	 entirely	 on	 theoretical	 proxies	 for	 studying	 it.	 However,	 it	 is	 rather	
surprising	 that	 very	 little	 research	 exists	 testing	 the	 empirical	 validity	 of	 these	
measures.	 Consequently,	 little	 consensus	 exists	 among	 empiricists	 on	 either	 the	
acceptability	 or	 the	 desirability	 of	 any	 of	 these	 proxies.	 This	 paper	 attempts	 to	
partially	 address	 this	 gap	 in	 literature	 by	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 two	 relatively	
popular	 proxies	 of	 information	 asymmetry:	 first,	 the	 Glosten	 and	 Harris	 (1988)	
spread	 decomposition	model	 based	 proxy	 and	 second,	 the	 Easley,	 Hvidkjaer,	 and	
O’Hara	(2002)	probability	of	informed	trading	(PIN)	measure.	
The	Glosten	and	Harris	(1988)	spread	decomposition	model	was	among	the	
earliest	 attempts	 at	 developing	 a	 proxy	 for	 measuring	 information	 asymmetry	
among	investors.	This	model	decomposes	the	quoted	bid‐ask	spreads	in	the	market	
into	a	permanent	component	(information	asymmetry)	and	a	transitory	component.	
Subsequently,	 several	 other	 proxies	 were	 also	 developed	 based	 on	 spread	
decomposition.	 These	 included	 Lin,	 Sanger,	 and	 Booth	 (1995),	 Huang	 and	 Stoll	
(1997)	 and	 Madhavan,	 Richardson,	 and	 Roomans	 (1997).	 While	 differences	 exist	
across	 these	 models,	 Huang	 and	 Stoll	 (1997)	 theoretically	 highlighted	 the	
underlying	 similarities	 among	 them.	 Clarke	 and	 Shastri	 (2000)	 found	 significant	
positive	 correlation	 among	 these	 measures,	 thus	 lending	 support	 to	 the	 same	
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conclusion.	 	 The	 spread	 decomposition	 based	 proxies	 of	 information	 asymmetry	
were	 the	measure	 of	 choice	 among	 empiricists	 throughout	 the	 90s	 and	 the	 early	





Armstrong,	 Core,	 Taylor,	 and	 Verrecchia	 (2011),	 Verrecchia	 and	 Weber	 (2006),	
Affleck‐Graves,	 Callahan,	 and	 Chipalkatti	 (2002),	 and	 Sadka	 (2006).	 Spread	
decomposition	 models	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 were	 developed	 with	 an	
underlying	 assumption	 of	 a	 prominent	 role	 by	 the	 monopolist	 specialist	 in	
determining	the	quotes.	As	markets	evolved,	the	diminishing	involvement	of	market	
makers	 and	 the	 increased	 role	of	 limit	books	and	other	markets	 in	 the	process	of	
price	formation	has	cast	doubts	on	the	validity	of	 these	models,	and	consequently,	
on	 the	 proxies	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 developed	 through	 them.	 It	 may	 be	










observed	 trade	 imbalances	 (the	 difference	 between	 the	 number	 of	 buy	 and	 the	
number	of	 sell	 orders).	 Since	 its	 inception,	 the	popularity	of	PIN	among	empirical	
researchers	 has	 been	 increasing	 rapidly.	 Some	 of	 the	 recent	 papers	 using	 this	
approach	for	measuring	information	asymmetry	include,	Hwang,	Lee,	Lim,	and	Park	
(2013),	 Armstrong,	 Balakrishnan,	 and	 Cohen	 (2012),	 Brown,	 Hillegeist,	 and	 Lo	
(2009),	Jayaraman	(2008),	Ferreira,	Ferreira,	and	Raposo	(2011),	Li,	Wang,	Wu,	and	
He	 (2009),	 Chen	Goldstein,	 and	 Jiang	 (2007).	However,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 debate	
casting	doubts	on	PIN	as	a	measure	of	 information	asymmetry.	Duarte	and	Young	
(2009)	find	that	only	the	liquidity	component	of	PIN	is	priced,	while	the	asymmetric	
information	component	 is	not,	 thereby	suggesting	that	PIN	is	a	proxy	for	 liquidity.		
Aktas,	 de	 Bodt,	 Declerck,	 and	 Van	 Oppens	 (2007)	 also	 cast	 doubts	 on	 PIN	 as	 a	
measure	of	information	asymmetry.	
Akay,	 Cyree,	 Griffiths,	 and	 Winters	 (2012)	 deconstruct	 the	 PIN	 proxy	 to	
highlight	the	dichotomy	between	the	empirical	and	the	theoretical	aspect	of	PIN	as	a	
measure	 of	 information	 asymmetry.	 According	 to	 them,	 the	 empirical	 estimate	 of	
PIN	 is	 designed	 to	 separate	 abnormal	 trading	 from	 normal	 trading	 and	 the	 PIN	
proxy	 is	 simply	 the	 ratio	 of	 the	 abnormal	 trading	 to	 total	 trading.	 The	 theoretical	







for	 T‐bills	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 answer	 the	 question,	 “What	 does	 PIN	 identify?”	 They	
argue	 that	 the	 T‐bill	 market	 should	 have	 little	 or	 no	 information	 asymmetry.	
Therefore,	 PIN	must	 approach	 zero	 if	 it	 is	 identifying	 the	 probability	 of	 informed	
trading.	 They	 find	 that	 T‐bills	 not	 only	 have	 a	 non‐zero	 PIN,	 but	 their	 PINs	 are	
significantly	 higher	 than	 equity	 PINs	 reported	 in	 extant	 literature.	 They	 conclude	
that	PIN	simply	identifies	liquidity‐based	clusters	in	T‐bills	markets.	
While	 the	above	analysis	 is	 fairly	 thorough,	 there	are	at	 least	 two	potential	
weaknesses,	which	could	benefit	 from	additional	research.	First,	 to	 the	extent	 that	
there	 could	 be	 asymmetric	 information	 about	 systematic	 components	 of	 asset	
returns,	there	could	still	be	non‐zero	asymmetric	information	in	the	T‐bill	market.1	
Second,	 microstructure	 measures	 are	 often	 sensitive	 to	 the	 market	 structure.	
Therefore,	 comparing	 numbers	 across	 different	 markets	 could	 lead	 to	 potential	
problems.	Some	tests	based	on	assets	 from	the	equity	market	might	be	warranted	
before	we	can	extend	the	conclusions	of	the	above	paper	to	the	equity	markets.	
We	 use	 intraday	 trade	 and	 quote	 data	 on	 all	 broad‐based	 and	 sector	 ETFs	
trading	 on	 the	 NYSE	 between	 2001	 and	 2007	 and	 a	 set	 of	 matched	 stocks.	 The	
																																																								
1	Subrahmanyam	 (1991)	 entertains	 the	 possibility	 of	 asymmetric	 information	 about	 systematic	
components	of	asset	returns	and	includes	an	informed	traders	factor	in	his	model.	Easley,	Hvidkjaer,	
and	O’Hara	 (2002)	 also	 allow	 for	 a	 common	 component	 in	 private	 information.	 This	 commonality	
could	 potentially	 be	 caused	 by	 asymmetric	 information	 about	 systematic	 factors.	 Finally,	 most	
textbooks	on	 investing	 include	sections	on	“top	down”	strategies	and	tactical	asset	allocation.	Such	
approaches	to	investing	rely	on	investors	being	able	to	avoid	(select)	asset	categories	or	industries	
that	 will	 do	 relatively	 poorly	 (well).	 Asymmetry	 about	 systematic	 factors	 is	 implicit	 in	 these	
approaches.	
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general	 idea	 is	 that	 the	 broad‐based	 ETFs	 should	 reflect	 primarily	 market	 wide	
uncertainty	 and	 therefore	 have	 low,	 but	 potentially	 positive	 levels	 of	 asymmetric	
information.	 The	 level	 of	 a	 broad‐based	 ETF’s	 asymmetric	 information	 should	 be	
related	 to	 its	 level	 of	 diversification.	 Sector	 ETFs	 should	 have	 market	 wide	
asymmetry	and	also	asymmetry	related	to	the	industry	component	of	their	returns.	
This	 suggests	 that	 sector	 ETFs	 should	 have	 higher	 asymmetric	 information	 than	
broad‐based	 ETFs.	 Finally,	 the	 individual	 equities	 that	 trade	 on	 U.S.	 exchanges	
should	 have	 three	 components	 to	 their	 information	 environment:	 market‐wide	
information,	 industry	 information,	 and	 idiosyncratic	 information.	 Therefore,	 we	
expect	the	asymmetric	information	for	individual	equities	to	be	higher	than	that	in	
both,	broad‐based	and	sector	ETFs.	
We	begin	 our	 analysis	 by	 estimating	 the	 spread	decomposition	measure	 of	
information	asymmetry	using	the	Glosten	and	Harris	(1988)	model	and	estimating	
the	 probability	 of	 informed	 trading	 (PIN)	 using	 the	 Easley,	 Hvidkjaer,	 and	O’Hara	
(2002)	model	for	each	of	the	ETFs	and	the	stocks	in	our	sample,	for	each	year.	Our	
average	 PIN	 estimate	 for	 broad‐based	 ETFs	 is	 approximately	 32%,	 which	 is	
substantially	 greater	 than	 the	 average	 PIN	measure	 for	 the	 set	 of	matched	 stocks	
(11%).	Similarly	the	average	PIN	for	sector	ETF	is	approximately	29%.	This	pattern	
is	consistent	across	each	year	in	our	analysis.	We	find	that	the	average	Glosten	and	
Harris	 (1988)	 adverse	 selection	 component	 for	 broad‐based	 ETF	 is	 14%	 of	 the	
spread,	which	is	significantly	less	than	the	average	estimate	for	the	set	of	matched	
stocks	(31%).	Similarly	the	average	adverse	selection	component	for	the	sector	ETF	
is	 15%.	 Since	 the	 spread	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 stock	 price,	 it	 might	 be	 more	
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informative	to	consider	the	estimated	lambda	as	a	fraction	of	each	dollar	traded.	We	
find	 that	 the	 average	 adverse	 selection	 cost	 of	 trading,	 per	 dollar	 invested	 is	
estimated	to	be	2.68	basis	points	for	the	broad‐based	ETFs,	3.77	basis	points	for	the	
sector	ETFs	and	4.15	basis	points	for	the	stocks.	Thus,	we	find	that	while	the	spread	
decomposition	 measure	 is	 consistent	 with	 our	 prediction,	 for	 each	 year	 in	 our	
sample,	 the	 PIN	 measure	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 correctly	 identifying	 information	
asymmetry.		
The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 continues	 as	 follows.	 In	 section	 2	 we	 present	
some	background	discussion	and	our	empirical	predictions.	Section	3	discusses	our	
data	 and	 our	 empirical	 specifications.	 In	 section	 4	 we	 present	 our	 results.	 We	
conclude	in	section	5.	
2. Background	and	research	design	
The	 degree	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 is	 not	 directly	 observable	 and	
therefore	 researchers	 need	 to	 rely	 on	 proxy	 variables.	 Unfortunately	 the	 same	
reason	also	makes	it	difficult	to	empirically	test	the	appropriateness	of	the	various	
proxies.	In	our	attempt	to	assess	the	validity	of	PIN	and	Glosten	and	Harris	(1988)	,	
we	 examine	 the	 relative	 levels	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 the	 market	 for	
individual	 stocks	 and	 contrast	 it	with	 the	 levels	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 the	
diversified	ETFs	 (Exchange	 traded	Funds).	We	argue	 that	 the	 level	 of	 information	
asymmetry	 for	 stocks	 should	 be	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 diversified	ETFs.	This	 section	
provides	some	background	discussion	on	information	asymmetry	and	its	potential	





Bagehot	 (1971)	 attributes	 the	 revenues	 of	 the	 market	 maker	 to	 the	
transactions	by	three	categories	of	market	participants.	The	first	group	consists	of	
traders	with	special	(private)	information,	the	second	group	comprises	of	 liquidity	
motivated	 traders,	 and	 finally,	 the	 third	 group	 of	 traders	 act	 upon	 publically	
available	 information,	 incorrectly	 believing	 that	 the	 information	 has	 not	 yet	 been	
fully	discounted	in	the	market	prices.	Here,	the	market	maker	will	invariably	lose	to	
the	first	group.	However,	he	will	always	gain	from	transacting	with	liquidity	traders	
as	 well	 as	 the	 traders	 in	 the	 third	 category	 because	 they	 are	 trading	 against	 the	
market	 maker’s	 spread.	 Stoll	 (1992)	 identified	 three	 components	 of	 the	 market	
maker’s	bid‐ask	spread.	The	first	component	is	order‐processing	cost,	consisting	of	
all	 fixed	 and	 variable	 costs	 such	 as	 cost	 of	 space,	 communications,	 labor,	 etc.,	
incurred	by	the	market	maker.	The	second	component	is	the	inventory	carrying	cost	
of	 the	 market	 maker,	 a	 consequence	 of	 bearing	 the	 risk	 of	 carrying	 excess	 or	
inadequate	 inventory.	The	 third	component	 is	 the	adverse	 information	cost	which	
arises	 from	 the	 market	 maker’s	 disadvantage	 in	 transacting	 with	 traders	 who	
possess	special	(private)	information.	
A	 significant	 volume	 of	 market‐microstructure	 research	 is	 devoted	 to	
measuring	 the	 third	 component	 of	 the	 transaction	 cost	 (portion	 of	 the	 bid‐ask	
spread),	 which	 arises	 from	 the	 market	 maker’s	 informational	 disadvantage	
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(information	 asymmetry).	 Early	 literature	 tends	 to	 equate	 informed	 traders	 with	
firm	 insiders	 and	 to	 that	 extent	 the	 private	 information	 was	 understood	 as	 firm	
characteristics.	2	More	 recently,	 the	 definition	 of	 private	 information	 has	 been	
modified,	 whereby	 it	 now	 includes	 sophisticated	 trading	 resulting	 from	 any	
informational	 advantage.3	In	 terms	 of	 deriving	 informational	 advantage,	 earlier	
literature	 tended	 to	 view	 investors	 as	 two	 homogenous	 groups	 (Kyle,	 1985).	 One	
group	receives	 the	 information	and	 thus	becomes	 informed	while	 the	other	group	
remains	uninformed.		Subsequently,	Papers	by	Harris	and	Raviv	(1993),	Kandel	and	
Pearson	(1995),	Kim	and	Verrecchia	(1994,	1997)	and	Lundholm	(1991)	explored	
the	 idea	 of	 differential	 interpretations	 of	 common	 signals,	 thus	 allowing	 for	




are	 privy	 to	 firm	 specific	 information	 such	 as	 a	 pending	 merger	 or	 product	
development,	 etc.	 	 This	 idiosyncratic	 information	 would	 be	 diversified	 away	 in	 a	
large	portfolio	and	knowledge	about	any	one	firm	in	the	portfolio	would	not	prove	












impact	 of	 asset	 specific	 information	 becomes	 arbitrarily	 small	 and	 the	 adverse	
selection	 component	 of	 liquidity	 will	 have	 to	 largely	 come	 through	 asymmetric	
information	 about	 the	 systematic	 factors.	 Therefore,	 as	 the	 level	 of	 diversification	
increases,	 the	 set	 of	 potentially	 useful	 information	 that	 could	 give	 rise	 to	
informational	advantage	about	the	asset	diminishes.	
Furthermore,	 public	 information	 can	 be	 about	 systematic	 factors	
(macroeconomic	news)	and/or	idiosyncratic	in	nature	(analysts’	forecasts,	financial	
statements,	firm	news	releases).	While	both	sources	of	information	could	potentially	
improve	 the	 forecasting	 ability	with	 regards	 to	 individual	 stocks,	 only	 systematic	















Easley,	 Hvidkjaer,	 and	 O’Hara	 (2002)	 define	 PIN	 as	 the	 ratio	 of	 informed	
trades	to	total	trades.	
                                                                                         (1)
S B
PIN      	
Where	α	is	the	frequency	of	information	events	(the	probability	of	the	arrival	of	new	
information),	 μ	 is	 the	 arrival	 rate	 of	 informed	 orders,	 S 	is	 the	 arrival	 rate	 of	
uninformed	sell	orders,	and	 B is	the	arrival	rate	of	uninformed	buy	orders.	To	the	




the	 PIN	 estimate	 becomes	 the	 ratio	 of	 abnormal	 trading	 to	 total	 trading.	 The	
underlying	 assumption	 being	 that	 only	 informed	 trading	 should	 give	 rise	 to	
clustering	of	trades.	This	assumption	is	key	to	PIN	being	interpreted	as	a	measure	of	
informed	 trading	 and	 thereby	 a	 proxy	 for	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 the	market.5	
Apart	 from	 the	 potential	weakness	 of	 this	 assumption,	Hwang,	 Lee,	 Lim	 and	Park	
(2013)	also	point	towards	potential	error	in	proxy	arising	from	misclassification	of	
buys	 and	 sells,	 thus	 casting	doubt	 on	 all	 proxies	 of	 information	asymmetry	which	
rely	on	identification	of	trade	direction.	






permanent	 component	 and	 a	 transitory	 component.	 The	permanent	 component	 is	
interpreted	 as	 the	 innovation	 in	 the	 market	 maker’s	 beliefs	 due	 to	 trading	 with	
informed	 traders.	 	 The	 model	 used	 for	 the	 estimation	 of	 this	 proxy	 relates	 the	
change	in	transaction	price	to	the	transaction	volume	and	to	a	buy/sell	indicator	in	
the	following	specification:	
0 1 0 1                                                          (2)t t t t t t t tP c I c I V z I z I V         	
Here,	 tI 	is	a	trade	indicator	that	equals	1	if	the	tth	transaction	is	buyer‐initiated	and	
negative	one	(‐1)	if	it	is	seller‐initiated;	 tP is	the	transaction	price	for	the	tth	trade;	 tV 	
is	 the	 volume	 traded;	 and	 t captures	 public	 news.	 In	 this	 model,	 the	 permanent	
(information	asymmetry)	component	 is	  0 12 tz z V ,	and	the	transitory	(inventory‐
holding	 and	 order‐processing)	 component	 is	 given	 by	  0 12 tc cV .	 The	 adverse	
selection	component	as	a	percentage	of	the	spread	is	given	by:	
 
   0 10 1 0 1
2




c cV z zV
    	
where	V is	the	average	transaction	volume	over	the	estimation	period.	
The	Glosten	and	Harris	(1988)	proxy	for	information	asymmetry,	as	all	other	
proxies	 based	 on	 spread	 decomposition,	was	 designed	 for	 a	 quote	 driven	market	
and	relied	heavily	on	the	dominant	role	of	the	market	maker	in	determining	the	bid‐
ask	 spread.	 Over	 time,	 the	 markets	 have	 increasingly	 moved	 away	 from	 being	
primarily	quote	driven	to	becoming	order	driven.	In	an	order	driven	market,	traders	
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and	 their	unexecuted	 limit	orders	are	 the	primary	providers	of	 liquidity.	With	 the	








buy	and	sell	orders	and	attempt	 to	 find	a	price	 that	equilibrates	 these	pressures”.	




Traders	 provide	 liquidity	 in	 an	 order	 driven	market	 through	 their	 market	
orders	 and	 unfilled	 limit	 orders.	 Arguably,	 as	 providers	 of	 liquidity,	 these	 traders	
can	 still	 be	 expected	 to	 require	 compensation	 for	 order	 handling	 costs.	 However,	
unlike	a	market	maker,	no	trader	has	an	obligation	to	make	the	market	and	take	the	
opposite	side	of	a	 trade.	Therefore,	 inventory	risks	are	 less	 likely	 to	be	 important.	
Glosten	(1994)	presents	a	theoretical	argument	suggesting	that	limit	order	markets	
will	 have	 a	 positive	 bid‐ask	 spread	 arising	 from	 the	 possibility	 of	 at	 least	 some	
market	participants	trading	on	their	private	information.	Similarly,	Handa,	Schwartz	
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and	 Tiwari	 (2003)	 in	 their	 theoretical	model	 show	 that	 the	 bid‐ask	 spread	 in	 an	
order‐driven	market	is	likely	to	be	a	function	of	the	differences	in	share	valuations	
across	 various	 market	 participants.	 These	 theoretical	 models	 suggest	 that	 the	
adverse	selection	cost	(information	asymmetry)	is	still	a	component	of	the	bid	ask	
spread	 in	order‐driven	markets.	 In	 an	equilibrium	model,	 stock	price	must	 reflect	
the	value	of	the	firm	and	to	the	extent	that	the	value	of	the	firm	gets	into	the	stock	
price	through	the	resolution	of	the	information	asymmetry	across	the	traders,	this	
cost	must	 still	 be	 the	permanent	price	 component	of	 the	bid‐ask	 spread;	 all	 other	
costs	could	constitute	the	transitory	costs.6		
2.4. Idiosyncratic	volatility	
We	 use	 a	 measure	 of	 idiosyncratic	 volatility	 as	 an	 alternate	 measure	 of	
information	asymmetry.	Idiosyncratic	volatility	is	a	measure	of	the	amount	of	price	
variability	 due	 to	 firm	 specific	 information.	 This	 should	 be	 directly	 related	 to	 the	
level	 of	 informed	 trading	 in	 the	 market	 and	 thereby	 the	 level	 of	 information	
asymmetry.	 We	 estimate	 this	 measure	 using	 two	 approaches:	 first,	 following	
Rajgopal	and	Venkatachalam	(2010),	we	estimate	the	idiosyncratic	volatility	as	the	
standard	deviation	of	the	residuals	   from	the	Fama	French	(1993)	three	factor	
model:	
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We	employ	all	broad‐based	equity	ETFs,	 sector	ETFs,	 and	a	 set	of	matched	
stocks	in	this	study.		Our	sample	covers	the	period	from	January	2001	to	December	
2007.	 	We	 start	 in	 2001	 because	 although	 SPDRs	 began	 trading	 on	 the	 AMEX	 in	
February	 1993,	 sector	 ETFs	 did	 not	 begin	 trading	 until	 December	 1998.	 	 With	 a	
sample	size	of	less	than	20	ETFs	trading	before	2001,	any	statistical	analysis	would	
be	suspect	at	best.	
We	 begin	 with	 the	 entire	 population	 of	 all	 ETFs	 trading	 in	 the	 US	market	
before	applying	screens	to	the	data.		Our	first	screen	requires	the	ETF	to	be	trading	
on	the	NYSE	or	the	AMEX	and	to	be	a	pure	equity	ETF.	We	also	require	the	average	
trading	 price	 of	 the	 ETF	 in	 a	 given	 year	 to	 be	 at	 least	 $5.00	 and	 it	 must	 have	
remained	listed	on	NYSE/AMEX	for	all	12	months	of	the	year.	Our	starting	sample	














sector	 ETF	 market	 cap	 was	 $193	 million.	 Contrasting	 these	 numbers	 with	 2007,	
where	the	average	size	of	broad‐based	and	sector	ETFs	increase	to	$3.75	billion	and	
$737	million	 respectively;	we	observe	 tremendous	 growth	 in	ETFs	 through	 time.8	
Table	1	also	presents	information	on	the	trading	volume	of	the	ETFs.		Broad‐based	
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processing	 components	 of	 trading	 costs	 across	 the	 ETF	 sample	 and	 the	 matched	
stock	sample.		While	searching	for	the	best	match,	we	include	only	common	stocks,	
which	have	remained	listed	on	either	the	NYSE	or	the	AMEX	for	all	12	months	of	the	
year.	We	also	 require	 these	 stocks	 to	have	data	available	on	 the	NYSE	Trade‐and‐
Quote	 database	 (TAQ)	 and	 the	 Center	 for	 Research	 in	 Security	 Prices	 (CRSP)	






in	 our	 matching,	 we	 control	 for	 differences	 in	 these	 characteristics	 in	 our	 cross‐
sectional	examination	of	levels.	
Transaction	level	trade	and	quote	data	for	all	ETFs	and	stocks	are	retrieved	




quotes	 (passive	 quotes	 by	 secondary	 market	 dealers).	 	 This	 can	 cause	 quoted	
spreads	 to	be	 artificially	 inflated.	 Since	 there	 is	 no	 reliable	way	 to	 filter	 out	 auto‐
quotes	 in	 TAQ,	 only	 NBBO	 (national	 best	 bid	 or	 offer)	 eligible	 primary	 market	
(NYSE/AMEX)	 quotes	 are	 used.	 	 Quotes	 established	 before	 the	 opening	 of	 the	
market	 or	 after	 the	 close	 are	 discarded.	 Negative	 bid‐ask	 spread	 quotations,	
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negative	transaction	prices,	and	negative	quoted	depths	are	discarded.		Trades	with	




Table	 2	 presents	 a	 univariate	 comparison	 of	 PIN	 (probability	 of	 informed	
trading,	 as	 calculated	 using	 the	 Easley,	 Hvidkjaer,	 and	 O’Hara,	 2002	 model)	 and	
lambda	 (adverse	 selection	 cost	 component	 of	 the	 spread,	 as	 calculated	 using	 the	
Glosten	and	Harris,	1988	model)	across	broad‐based	and	sector	ETFs	and	a	set	of	





is	 inconsistent	 with	 broad‐based	 and	 sector	 ETFs	 having	 lower	 information	
asymmetry	than	the	individual	stocks.	
Panel	 B	 presents	 the	 lambdas	 for	 the	 sample.	 Average	 broad‐based	 ETF	
lambda	 is	 estimated	 to	 be	 13.9%	 of	 the	 spread.	 Average	 sector	 ETFs	 lambda	 is	
estimated	to	be	marginally	higher	at	14.55%	of	the	spread	and	the	average	lambda	
for	 the	 set	 of	 stocks	 is	 significantly	 higher	 at	 31.23%	 of	 the	 spread.	 Since	 these	








is	 consistent	 with	 the	 expectation	 that	 the	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 individual	
stocks	 should	be	greater	 than	 the	 information	asymmetry	 in	 a	broadly	diversified	
portfolio.	We	do	find	that	in	2003	the	sector	ETF	cost	is	higher	than	the	individual	




Panels	 D	 and	 E	 of	 Table	 2	 present	 the	 univariate	 comparison	 in	 terms	 of	
idiosyncratic	 volatility.	 This	 is	 an	 alternate	measure	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 in	
the	market.	We	use	 two	 related	measures	 of	 idiosyncratic	 volatility,	 as	 defined	 in	
equations	(4)	and	(5).	While	Panel	D	presents	the	coefficient	of	determination	(R2)	
based	 measure,	 Panel	 E	 presents	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 residuals	 from	
equation	 (4).	 The	 R2	 based	 measure	 is	 a	 logarithmic	 transform	 allowing	 the	
estimated	 number	 to	 range	 from	 negative	 infinity	 to	 positive	 infinity.	 Higher	
numbers	suggest	greater	levels	of	information	asymmetry.	We	find	that	the	broad‐




measure,	 which	 is	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 residuals	 from	 the	 asset	 pricing	
equation	 defined	 in	 equation	 (4),	 provides	 consistent	 results	 with	 smallest	
information	asymmetry	 for	 the	broad‐based	ETFs	 (0.0268)	 followed	by	 the	 sector	
ETFs	(0.0377)	and	the	highest	level	for	stocks	(0.0415).	These	results	are	consistent	






defined	 by	 Amihud	 (2012).9	To	 the	 extent	 that	 adverse	 selection	 is	 related	 to	












The	 annual	 average	 of	 the	 daily	 ratio	 between	 a	 stock´s	 absolute	 return	 and	 its	






this	 ratio	 measures	 “the	 daily	 price	 response	 associated	 with	 one	 dollar	 trading	




significant.	 This	 may	 seem	 surprising	 and	 rather	 curious.	 However,	 the	 sign	 is	
consistent	 with	 the	 correlations	 reported	 in	 Clarke	 and	 Shastri	 (2000).	 Scaled	
lambda	 is	positively	 correlated	with	both	measures	of	 idiosyncratic	volatility	 (IV),	
suggesting	that	greater	level	of	IV	is	associated	with	higher	information	asymmetry	
in	 the	 market.	 Scaled	 Lambda	 is	 also	 positively	 associated	 with	 the	 Amihud	
illiquidity	ratio.	Thus	suggesting	that	lower	liquidity	is	associated	with	higher	levels	
of	 information	 asymmetry.	However,	 once	 again	PIN	 is	 negatively	 correlated	with	
both	 measures	 of	 IV	 and	 positively	 related	 with	 the	 level	 of	 illiquidity.	 Return	
volatility	 also	 changes	 sign	 in	 terms	of	 its	 association	with	PIN	vs.	 scaled	 lambda.	
Remaining	 correlations	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 extant	 literature.	 Both	 PIN	 and	
lambda	 are	 negatively	 correlated	 with	 trading	 volume	 and	 stock	 price.	 Higher	
trading	volume	is	associated	with	lower	information	asymmetry	and	lower	adverse	
selection	 cost	 of	 trading.	 Similarly,	 larger	 stocks	 on	 average	 have	 lower	 adverse	









Transaction	 costs	 are	 affected	 by	 prices,	 trading	 volume,	 and	 volatility.	 	 Our	
matching	 process	 attempted	 to	 control	 for	 these	 characteristics,	 but	 as	 shown	 in	
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The	dependent	variable	is	the	PIN	in	equation	(8),	and	the	adverse	selection	cost	per	
dollar	 traded	 (lambda	 scaled	 by	 share	 price)	 in	 equation	 (9).	 The	 independent	
variables	 are	 share	 price	 (Price),	 Share	 volatility	  ret ,	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 the	
trading	 volume	 (ln(vol)),	 and	 dummy	 variables	 that	 take	 the	 value	 0	 for	 the	 base	
case	 category	 (stocks)	 and	 the	 value	 1	 for	 the	 comparison	 category	 (broad‐based	
and	sector	ETFs).	
Table	 4	 presents	 estimates	 of	 3 	(the	 coefficient	 on	 DBroad	 and	 DSector)	 and	
their	 corresponding	 t‐statistics.	 Panels	A	 and	B	present	 the	 results	 of	 running	 the	
regression	 specified	 in	 equation	 (8).	 Panel	A	 compares	 the	broad‐based	ETFs	 and	
the	 sector	 ETFs	 to	 the	 set	 of	 matched	 stocks.	 Panel	 B	 repeats	 the	 analysis,	 in	
	 22
comparing	 broad‐based	 ETFs	 to	 the	 set	 of	 sector	 ETFs.	 Panel	 A	 reinforces	 the	
conclusions	 of	 Table	 2,	 robust	 to	 controlling	 for	 trading	 volume	 (ln(vol)),	 return	




stocks	 even	 in	 a	 multivariate	 setup.	 These	 results	 once	 again	 contradict	 the	
interpretation	 of	 PIN	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 the	 market.	
Extending	the	diversification	argument	from	section	2	of	this	paper,	we	expect	the	
broad‐based	 ETFs	 to	 have	 lower	 information	 asymmetry	 than	 the	 sector	 ETFs.	
While	 the	 results	 of	 Panel	 B	 are	 not	 consistently	 significant,	we	 do	 notice	 that	 in	
most	years,	broad	based	PIN	is	greater	than	the	sector	PIN.	




controlling	 for	 trading	 volume,	 return	 volatility	 and	 price,	 the	 per	 dollar	 cost	 of	
trading	(due	to	adverse	selection)	is	lower	for	the	set	of	broad‐based	ETFs	by	38.5%	
as	 compared	 to	 the	 corresponding	 cost	 of	 trading	 stocks.	 The	 per	 dollar	 cost	 of	
trading	 (due	 to	adverse	selection)	 is	 lower	 for	 the	set	of	 sector	ETFs	by	34.2%	as	
compared	to	the	corresponding	cost	of	trading	stocks.	Panel	D	presents	the	result	of	
comparing	 broad‐based	 ETFs	 with	 sector	 ETFs	 in	 terms	 of	 lambda	 per	 dollar.	
Although	the	results	are	not	always	significant,	the	adverse	selection	cost	of	trading	
	 23
broad‐based	 ETF	 is	 found	 to	 be	 lower	 than	 the	 adverse	 selection	 cost	 of	 trading	







could	be	picking	up	 the	activities	of	discretionary	 liquidity	 traders.	Drawing	upon	
this,	we	attempt	to	better	understand	PIN	and		by	exploring	their	association	with	
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To	 the	 extent	 that	 increased	 levels	 of	 adverse	 selection	 risk	 is	 expected	 to	 be	
associated	with	wider	spreads	and	lower	liquidity,	this	finding	does	not	contradict	
the	interpretation	of	PIN	as	an	information	proxy.	However,	we	also	find	that	PIN	is	
negatively	 associated	 with	 idiosyncratic	 volatility,	 thereby	 suggesting	 that	 stocks	
with	 relatively	 higher	 idiosyncratic	 volatility	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 those	with	 relatively	
lower	PIN.11	If	idiosyncratic	volatility	is	a	measure	of	information	asymmetry	about	
the	firm,	the	negative	coefficient	suggests	that	PIN	is	at	best	a	measure	of	a	lack	of	
information	 asymmetry	 (higher	 PIN	 suggesting	 lower	 information	 asymmetry).	
However,	 we	 have	 to	 be	 careful	 in	 this	 generalization	 of	 our	 finding	 because	 the	
negative	coefficient	in	this	case	could	simply	be	a	result	of	the	design	of	our	study.	
ETFs	 have	 lower	 idiosyncratic	 volatility	 and	 higher	 PIN	 than	 the	 corresponding	
matched	stocks.	
Table	5;	Panel	B	reports	the	results	of	our	analysis	of	lambda	(Equation	11).	
We	 find	that	scaled	 lambda,	controlling	 for	stock	price,	 trading	volume	and	return	
volatility,	 is	 positively	 associated	 with	 Amihud	 illiquidity	 ratio.	 In	 this	 respect	
lambda	 behaved	 identical	 to	 PIN,	 in	 that,	 stocks	 with	 higher	 illiquidity	 (or	 lower	
liquidity)	are	likely	to	have	greater		per	dollar	traded.	We	also	find	that	lambda	is	
positively	 associated	 with	 idiosyncratic	 volatility.	 Therefore,	 stocks	 with	 greater	
idiosyncratic	 volatility	 or	 information	 asymmetry	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 higher	 	 per	








Do	 microstructure	 based	 proxies	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 correctly	
identify	 informed	 trading?	We	 conducted	 this	 study	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 answer	 the	
question.	Since	by	definition,	 information	asymmetry	cannot	be	directly	measured,	
we	 could	not	 simply	 compare	 these	proxies	with	 the	measure	of	 true	 information	







We	 select	 two	 measures	 of	 information	 asymmetry:	 PIN	 (probability	 of	
informed	 trading),	 a	 relatively	popular	measure,	which	has	 come	under	 increased	
scrutiny	 in	 the	 last	 few	 years	 and	 the	 Glosten	 and	 Harris	 (1988)	 permanent	
component	 of	 the	 spread.	 While	 the	 Glosten	 and	 Harris	 (1988)	 measure	 (or	 a	
modified	 version	 of	 it)	 was	 rather	 popular	 in	 the	 90’s,	 it	 was	 discarded	 in	 more	





is	 still	 the	 permanent	 component	 of	 the	 order‐driven	 market	 quote,	 proxies	 of	
information	asymmetry	that	are	based	on	the	decomposition	of	these	quotes	into	a	
permanent	and	transitory	component	are	still	likely	to	be	valid.	
Our	 results	 reinforce	 those	of	Akay,	Cyree,	Griffiths,	 and	Winters	 (2012)	 in	
suggesting	that	while	PIN	is	related	to	liquidity,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	a	valid	proxy	
























































































































2001  20   $1,245,554.43   922,656   $82.35  0.01482 
2002  22   $2,223,957.11   1,905,435   $73.07  0.01743 
2003  25   $2,971,308.40   2,199,758   $73.22  0.01270 
2004  30   $3,156,245.95   2,067,940   $81.02  0.01014 
2005  46   $2,842,344.52   2,258,267   $70.88  0.00882 
2006  65   $2,910,972.96   2,382,919   $66.92  0.00933 










2001  21   $193,021.92    254,725   $53.29  0.02906 
2002  22   $169,441.15    460,744   $47.71  0.02447 
2003  22   $290,258.99    617,666   $53.92  0.01717 
2004  25   $368,832.09    1,158,438   $59.96  0.01408 
2005  35   $373,464.31    1,142,564   $62.89  0.01131 
2006  56   $424,864.78    822,116   $52.05  0.01235 











2001   761,159    $61.48  0.02720  1,042,999   $46.19   0.03602
2002   913,839    $65.92  0.02546  1,869,071   $44.87   0.03401
2003   550,255    $64.56  0.02249  1,071,873   $46.85   0.03093
2004   1,064,402    $62.53  0.01866  789,977   $46.30   0.03023
2005   1,952,258    $61.05  0.01504  1,740,310   $55.80   0.02118
2006   1,816,413    $55.16  0.01266  1,127,660   $44.64   0.01774




















2001  36.30%  30.79%  14.86% 2001 15.03% 15.70%  40.06%
2002  30.46%  33.79%  10.87% 2002 13.42% 16.89%  34.96%
2003  29.83%  24.91%  11.24% 2003 13.00% 16.72%  39.65%
2004  27.53%  24.20%  14.14% 2004 12.83% 11.58%  37.40%
2005  28.45%  25.86%  9.50% 2005 14.48% 14.58%  28.79%
2006  32.38%  33.07%  10.55% 2006 13.61% 13.40%  22.42%


















2001  ‐2.3648  ‐0.3958  2.2558 2001 0.0046 0.0165  0.0310
2002  ‐2.7475  ‐0.5018  1.7078 2002 0.0041 0.0148  0.0218
2003  ‐2.5398  ‐0.4788  0.7918 2003 0.0030 0.0093  0.0139
2004  ‐2.2068  ‐0.1668  1.4647 2004 0.0027 0.0081  0.0145
2005  ‐2.2188  ‐0.3618  1.9789 2005 0.0024 0.0065  0.0138
2006  ‐2.4258  ‐0.5258  2.1895 2006 0.0024 0.0066  0.0126









2001  0.0400  0.0634  0.0653
2002  0.0370  0.0691  0.0712
2003  0.0304  0.0471  0.0351
2004  0.0228  0.0241  0.0408
2005  0.0214  0.0248  0.0287
2006  0.0168  0.0198  0.0279





































PIN  1  ‐0.1289  ‐0.4487  ‐0.4203  0.3601  ‐0.3320  ‐0.3301  ‐0.1199 
                 
/Price  ‐0.3230  1  0.4161  0.5753  0.4039  0.5411  ‐0.0781  ‐0.5529 
                 
IV(R2)  ‐0.5160  0.6330  1  0.7284  0.0699  0.3533  ‐0.0596  ‐0.3120 
                 
IV ()  ‐0.4860  0.6630  0.8790  1  0.1720  0.7841  ‐0.0143  ‐0.3953 
                 
Illiq  0.6910  0.0850  0.1540  0.0150  1  0.1156  ‐0.0993  ‐0.3266 
                 
ret  ‐0.4100  0.4440  0.4260  0.6690  0.2010  1  0.1117  ‐0.3343 
                 
vol  ‐0.7610  ‐0.1490  ‐0.3350  ‐0.3570  ‐0.8570  0.5450  1  0.1333 
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  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006  2007
 1.008***  0.802***  0.696*** 0.558*** 0.512*** 0.612***  0.346
  10.27  7.953  12.062 8.141 8.052 10.247  1.331
Ln(vol)  ‐0.053***  ‐0.051***  ‐0.045*** ‐0.035*** ‐0.027*** ‐0.03***  ‐0.012**
  ‐5.892  ‐6.295  ‐9.057 ‐6.391 ‐5.4 ‐6.352  ‐2.38
ret  ‐2.023*  1.571  1.912 2.549* 0.606 ‐2.245*  0.606
  ‐1.981  1.414  1.425 1.907 0.359 ‐1.859  0.083
Price  ‐0.001***  ‐0.001*  0 0 ‐0.001*** ‐0.001***  ‐0.001
  ‐2.829  ‐1.781  ‐1.115 ‐0.843 ‐2.787 ‐4.659  ‐1.605
DBroad  0.134***  0.154***  0.145*** 0.125*** 0.135*** 0.149***  0.251***
  3.909  5.19  8.144 5.399 5.357 7.609  3.227
DSector  0.036  0.109***  0.068*** 0.079*** 0.102*** 0.147***  0.183**
  1.043  3.532  3.867 3.62 4.199 7.638  2.263
Adj. R2  0.632  0.556  0.614 0.448 0.464 0.61  0.515








  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
  1.171***  1.047***  0.885***  0.719***  0.647***  0.776***  0.588** 
  12.453  8.927  14.121  8.93  9.674  12.655  2.197 
Ln(vol)  ‐0.058***  ‐0.063***  ‐0.044***  ‐0.035***  ‐0.025***  ‐0.028***  ‐0.012** 
  ‐5.532  ‐5.225  ‐6.893  ‐4.788  ‐3.605  ‐4.466  ‐0.445 
ret  ‐2.379*  3.286  ‐1.245  ‐0.13  ‐0.534  ‐5.586**  2.883 
  ‐1.776  1.365  ‐0.492  ‐0.042  ‐0.147  ‐2.38  0.224 
Price  ‐0.001*  0  ‐0.001  0  ‐0.001**  ‐0.001***  ‐0.002 
  ‐1.707  ‐0.674  ‐1.315  ‐0.933  ‐2.214  ‐3.857  ‐1.431 
DBroad  0.084**  0.061*  0.064***  0.036  0.031  ‐0.007  0.068 
  2.669  1.733  3.095  1.361  1.178  ‐0.361  1.106 
Adj. R2  0.604  0.245  0.455  0.208  0.199  0.31  0.253 




  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
  0.986***  0.016***  1.314***  2.202***  1.394***  1.133***  0.614*** 
  2.775  2.771  2.831  3.898  4.236  5.511  3.18 
Ln(vol)  ‐0.016  ‐0.002***  ‐0.07*  ‐0.145***  ‐0.081***  ‐0.041**  ‐0.028* 
  ‐0.477  ‐3.345  ‐1.729  ‐3.243  ‐3.115  ‐2.499  ‐2.032 
ret  10.432***  0.61***  41.384***  66.389***  59.035***  17.524***  7.712 
  2.822  9.345  3.833  6.03  6.748  4.215  1.43 
Price  ‐0.005**  ‐0.038***  ‐0.007***  ‐0.008***  ‐0.009***  ‐0.006***  ‐0.040*** 
  ‐2.629  ‐6.456  ‐3.176  ‐3.801  ‐5.897  ‐8.245  ‐6.59 
DBroad  ‐0.385***  ‐0.004**  ‐0.325**  ‐0.312*  ‐0.19  ‐0.14**  ‐0.163*** 
  ‐3.101  ‐2.271  ‐2.275  ‐1.638  ‐0.996  ‐2.075  ‐2.827 
DSector  ‐0.342***  ‐0.003***  ‐0.286**  ‐0.304***  ‐0.181  ‐0.112*  ‐0.141*** 
  ‐3.545  ‐3.212  ‐2.009  ‐2.93  ‐1.429  ‐1.684  ‐3.341 
Adj. R2  0.645  0.71  0.505  0.524  0.475  0.421  0.446 






  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
  0.474**  0.004  0.782*  0.727*  0.888***  0.794***  0.333** 
  2.611  0.862  1.696  1.991  3.764  4.528  2.247 
Ln(vol)  ‐0.045**  ‐0.001***  ‐0.151***  ‐0.101***  ‐0.094***  ‐0.056***  ‐0.026* 
  ‐2.243  ‐2.911  ‐3.197  ‐3.063  ‐3.78  ‐3.117  ‐1.732 
ret  20.236***  0.695***  97.329***  95.302***  99.132***  48.245***  13.606* 
  7.825  8.027  5.229  6.839  7.718  7.19  1.904 
Price  ‐0.001  ‐0.0045  ‐0.001  ‐0.004***  ‐0.007***  ‐0.005***  ‐0.0034 
  ‐0.946  ‐0.172  ‐0.467  ‐2.68  ‐4.724  ‐6.262  ‐0.264 
DBroad  ‐0.117*  ‐0.001  ‐0.148  ‐0.265**  ‐0.146  ‐0.055  ‐0.044 
  ‐1.933  ‐0.96  ‐0.971  ‐2.184  ‐1.586  ‐0.979  ‐1.283 
Adj. R2  0.776  0.707  0.425  0.533  0.478  0.509  0.481 






The	 following	 table	 contains	 the	 results	 corresponding	 to	 two	 multivariate	 regressions	
used	to	explore	the	association	of	PIN	and	lambda	with	the	Amihud	(2002)	Illiquidity	ratio	




1 2 3 4 , 5 6...11 1...6
1 2 3 4 , 5 6...11 1...6
ln Price D  
ln Price DPrice




PIN IV ILLIQ vol
IV ILLIQ vol
        
         
             
              	
D1	through	D6	represent	six	year‐dummies	(2002	through	2007).	For	sake	of	brevity	these	
dummies	are	not	reported	in	the	tables	below.	




  0.4467***  0.2765***  0.2532*** 0.2888*** 0.42***  0.3221***
  18.1515  16.1613  14.2553  16.3167  17.3533  15.2992 
IV(R2)  ‐0.0197***  ‐0.0213***   
  ‐9.9482  ‐9.3681         
Illiq  1.069***  1.0934***  
  9.352    8.1579       
Ln(vol)  ‐0.0408***  ‐0.0525***  
  ‐5.9116      ‐6.6327     
ret  ‐5.0872***  ‐4.9216*** 
  ‐9.3532        ‐8.1103   
Price  ‐0.0009***    ‐0.0006***
  ‐5.8051          ‐3.6164 
Adj. R2  0.566  0.142 0.114 0.509 0.113  0.035










Intercept  0.4522***  0.5208***  0.391***  0.5081***  ‐0.2149**  1.0597*** 
  4.3901  7.2314  5.3566  6.8407  ‐2.2712  14.3926 
IV(R2)  0.027***  0.0623***         
  3.2605  6.4992         
Illiq  1.8975***    3.9745***       
  3.9665    7.2151       
Ln(vol)  ‐0.0086**      ‐0.0017**     
  ‐2.1048      ‐2.1588     
ret  14.9759***        25.7921***   
  6.5792        10.8709   
Price  ‐0.0067***          ‐0.0092*** 
  ‐10.4599          ‐14.9336 
Adj. R2  0.412  0.142  0.149  0.082  0.229  0.329 
N  1123  1123  1123  1123  1123  1123 
 
	
